Figure 1 AirAsia's Destinations and Routes
Source: AirAsia's 4th quarter 2008 analyst presentation (available online at http://www.airasia.com. my).
After seven years of continuous business expansion and profi tability, AirAsia incurred a fi nancial loss of MYR 471.7 million (equivalent to about US$ 135 million) 3 in the 2008 fi nancial year. What had happened to AirAsia and what had affected its fi nancial performance? Was its strategy relevant? We begin by describing AirAsia's current situation. We will then discuss its marketing strategy and highlight its key practices. We will use the Blue Ocean Strategy concept to examine how AirAsia developed new markets and speculate the direction the airline might be heading towards. Unless otherwise stated, the two major sources of information on AirAsia are AirAsia's offi cial website 4 and AirAsia's annual reports.
AIRASIA TODAY Table 1 shows AirAsia's vital statistics. Its business grew in almost all areas except for its profi tability in the 2008 fi nancial year. The airline blamed higher costs of aviation fuel, fi nance cost (which was largely due to foreign exchange loss amounting close to MYR 193 million or US$ 55.1 million), and exceptional items (largely, though not solely, attributed to the cost of unwinding fuel derivative contracts and losses in investment that resulted from the now defunct Lehman Brothers) for its poor fi nancial performance in 2008. However, Table 1 also shows that AirAsia, despite operating in an environment of high fuel costs, 5 still delivered operating profi ts (profi ts from its airline operations) at a level that was enough to cover depreciation and interests on its borrowing, 6 but insuffi cient to cover losses from foreign exchange and fuel price hedging. We now discuss AirAsia's achievements.
AirAsia's Management Practices
The low-cost carrier (LCC) business model, which AirAsia adopted, was grounded on the principles of creating and delivering passenger air travel solutions to customers 8 Thirdly, AirAsia kept its fi xed costs down by continuing to adopt management practices already discussed by Ahmad and Neal (2006) . A key strategy that AirAsia continued to use was to treat some of its fi xed costs as variable costs, for example, the crew was paid a proportion of their incomes as commissions that were tied to the actual sale of in-fl ight products or performance incentives dependant on staff productivity, which among other factors, also took into account their sick leaves.
9 Whenever feasible, AirAsia rented, leased or hired assets (buildings, vehicles, equipment and software) and outsourced or subcontracted some of its activities and services, such as ground services, to third parties. When serving a minor route (a small airport and a sector with non-frequent departures), such as Kuala Lumpur to Chiang Mai in North Thailand, AirAsia took its ground engineer aboard its fl ights instead of stationing him at Chiang Mai airport and subcontracted all other aircraft ground services at the airport. 10 The fourth strategy was to keep the costs of product distribution to a minimum. AirAsia continued to encourage customers to use the Internet and introduced innovative and user-friendly ways for customers to purchase passenger seats. The fi fth strategy that the airline employed was to use a single aircraft type. This also had positive results. The new and growing fl eet of Airbus 320s contributed to relatively low total aircraft maintenance and operating costs. However, AirAsia's associate company AirAsiaX 11 used wide body Airbus A340s and A330-300s on its long-haul fl ights due to operational reasons. AirAsia, as a group, committed itself to using two types of aircrafts, i.e., the A320s for its regional fl ights and the A330s for its long-haul fl ights. It was in the process of phasing out the remaining Boeing 737s and ordering more A320 and A330 aircrafts.
Its Target Markets
AirAsia's target market was no longer dominated by budget travellers from Malaysia. The airline had also attracted business travellers, corporations, government departments in Malaysia as well as travellers from outside Malaysia, and of late, longhaul travellers going to and from the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia.
In 2008, AirAsiaX fl ew into Hangzhou in Northeast China, the Gold Coast, Perth and Melbourne in Australia, and in 2009 to London Stansted in the UK, all of which were destinations outside the traditional two and a half hours fl ying time of low-cost carriers and outside AirAsia's self-imposed four hours of fl ying time.
Its Products
AirAsia's core products were passenger seats, but it also offered a number of complementary products. AirAsia's customers were able to add-on to their purchased passenger seats a variety of these complementary products. The end results were customer self-assembled actual products (end products customers fi nally received or experienced), such as the following: The actual products experienced by passengers were basically passenger seats augmented with travel service products, which at the time of writing comprised goholiday, gohostel, gocar and gomedic packages. Goholiday (now re-branded as Red2go) was a selection of holiday packages that customers could assemble from a combination of passenger seats plus airport transfers, hotel rooms, and activities at destinations such as group tours. AirAsia did not provide complementary products single-handedly. Gohostel was a complementary product provided by one of AirAsia's partners, Hostelworld. com. Gocar was a rent-a-car facility for AirAsia's customers provided by internationally renowned companies such as Hertz and Avis. Gomedic services enabled AirAsia's customers to purchase health checks, diagnostic services or even medical treatments from third parties such as Health Scan Malaysia, Life Care Diagnostic Medical Centre, Malaysia, Sunway Medical Centre, Malaysia, and Vista Vision Specialists, Malaysia. In partnership with local banks, some of these medical services, such as Lasik Visual Correction, were further augmented with easy monthly payments through which customers could avail medical loans. AirAsia's initiatives in informing customers about their forthcoming activities at various destinations were a part of its strategy to generate new demand for air travel. It is to be noted that not all complementary products could be regarded as cheap, relative to the price of passenger seats such as rooms in fi ve star hotels and car rentals, but they were nevertheless competitively priced. Prices were posted online and such a practice made the airline's offers transparent, which in turn made purchase decisions more convenient for the customers.
Additionally, AirAsia in partnership with banks, provided services that not only made it easier for customers to purchase its products but also helped AirAsia to earn additional revenue such as sales commissions. In Malaysia, AirAsia encouraged the Malaysian people to sign up for the CitiBank silver and gold Master credit cards, while in Indonesia the airline persuaded Indonesians to sign up for the HSBC silver and gold Visa credit cards. In Thailand, AirAsia launched its own Thai AirAsia Master card. By signing up for these co-branded/promoted credit cards, cardholders enjoyed a wide range of benefi ts from free travel insurance to free fl ights; the offers, however, varied from one country to another. E-gift vouchers, goinsure, express boarding, snack attack and redmegastore were additional products that passengers could buy in advance and Association of Private Hospitals Malaysia projected that the number of foreigners seeking medical treatment in Malaysia will grow at an annual rate of 30 per cent a year until 2010. (The press release was available online at http://www.tourism.gov.my/corporate/mediacentre.asp and was accessed on 28 March 2009.) in the case of snack attack (see description later) and redmegastore products, aboard fl ights. E-gift vouchers were electronic cash vouchers that customers could buy and then e-mail or give away as gifts to loved ones. Holders or benefi ciaries of these vouchers could use them to electronically purchase AirAsia's products. Goinsurance was travel protection insurance against unforeseeable circumstances such as fl ight cancellations, fl ight delays, lost luggage and personal accidents. For a small fee, passengers could purchase the express boarding facility that allowed them to board the aircraft ahead of other passengers. Snack attack was an in-fl ight dining service that gave passengers the option to choose between many local dishes including popular ethnic dishes, such as nasi lemak, a local dish in Malaysia and popular soft and cold drinks such as soyabean and sugarcane drinks.
13 Shop services provided an opportunity to buy AirAsia merchandise such as T-shirts and baseball caps.
Business persons and corporations could use gocorporate, which was a fl exible selfservice corporate account that enabled a company to book passenger seats online and make needed changes themselves. The product gocorporate also generated reports which were designed to help a corporate customer monitor the air travel expenses of its staff members. Targeted for corporations, AirAsia also provided aircraft charter services and offered advertising space on the fuselage of its aircrafts, behind the passenger seats, on its ground equipment, in the in-fl ight magazine and on other devices that may be used or seen by its passengers or the public.
The Prices it Charges
AirAsia facilitated its customers in assembling their desired product but each component was separately priced. The airline priced its passenger seats on a point-topoint sector or journey basis. This was done not only for customers' ease in planning their journeys but also for AirAsia's management ease in managing product delivery, particularly in reducing the risks of uncertainty of a continuous multi-sector journey. By selling seats on a point-to-point sector basis, AirAsia did not have to worry about fl ight connections and onward delays that might occur. The total fare per sector was broken down to three main sub-components: the fi rst was the basic airfare, which comprised fi fteen tiers; the second was the disbursable tax or passenger service charge; and the third was the add-on or surcharge that AirAsia claimed was a variable charge depending on the cost of fuel that the airline paid to its suppliers, on how tickets were purchased and the travel style of the passengers. For instance, a ticket would be cheaper if the customer purchased it online. The ticket price would be higher if the customer preferred to board the aircraft ahead of other passengers.
AirAsia collected a booking fee for tickets purchased via its call centres because of booking services rendered. It also charged for the use of wheelchairs, for seating services (through its product pick-a-seat), for all checked-in baggage, excess baggage according to weight (the maximum allowable free-of-charge baggage was only 15 kg) and for supersize baggage. Golf sets, scuba diving equipment and surf boards were charged separately. Flight changes and changes in passengers' names also called for a processing fee unless that had been waived off in lieu of a higher priced ticket, i.e., higher tier basic airfares. Although the lowest basic airfare was zero airfare, AirAsia still earned income from add-on charges and from the sale of complementary products.
Its Methods of Communicating with Customers
In communicating with its present and potential customers, AirAsia employed a combination of methods that ranged from conventional advertisements, public relations, personal selling and sales promotion to using the Internet and the media. AirAsia put in a lot of creative effort in making its products available to a wide range of customers. Even though the airline continued to use travel and sky agents to sell passenger seats, it emphasized selling tickets directly to customers at airport terminals, through its call centres and online over the Internet.
AirAsia made frequent press statements (106 press releases in 2008 against 48 in 2007) and these initiatives obviously attracted media attention. Following a fall in the price of crude oil, the airline, for instance, announced the abolishment of fuel surcharges ahead of Malaysia Airlines' announcement. Tony Fernandes, the chief executive of AirAsia, launched new businesses that were grounded on the principle of no-frills and low-cost products that complemented AirAsia such as Tune Hotels and Tune Money. Tune Hotels were budget hotels in Malaysia, while Tune Money was a pre-paid charge card sold in Malaysia. In recognition of Tony Fernandes's contribution to the air travel industry, Aviation Week presented him with the Laureate Award in the Air Transport category-an award that recognizes exceptional strategy, heroism and leadership in aviation, aerospace and defense.
14 The publicity generated by these complementary businesses and the international recognition awarded to Tony Fernandes, indirectly enhanced AirAsia's brand awareness and offered the airline cross-selling opportunities.
On the international front, AirAsia associated itself with football by working in partnership with the English Premier League, an internationally renowned football competition. The AirAsia brand was prominent in all English league matches. The airline was also featured on the Manchester United Football Club's stadium billboards. Millions of television viewers watched live Manchester United matches that gave AirAsia's brand a global exposure.
The AirAsia brand also appeared in motor racing (internationally in Formula 1, contracted for three years from 2007, and locally in the 2007 Endurance Race) and sailing events, such as the Monsoon Cup in Malaysia (an annual event). In Malaysia, a credit card co-branding agreement with CitiBank and in Indonesia with HSBC opened up new channels of communication with customers.
AIRASIA'S MARKETING STRATEGY
AirAsia's marketing strategies were simple and consisted of the following elements:
1. The airline kept prices of its core product (passenger seats) relatively low and offered various price points that might suit different groups of customers. The average fare increased steadily from MYR 131 (US$ 37.4) to MYR 204 (US$ 58.3) in the last fi ve years (see Table 1 ), which refl ected an increase in the cost per available seat per km as well as an increase in the longer distance sectors that AirAsia had introduced. 2. It fi lled up its aircrafts early by selling some of the available seats in advance, even at zero prices. AirAsia's average load factor was 75.4 per cent in 2008. 3. Whenever possible, AirAsia mounted high fl ight frequency on all routes, for example, it mounted twenty fl ights a day on its Kuala Lumpur-Kota Kinabalu-Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Lumpur-Kuching-Kuala Lumpur routes or ten fl ights per sector per day.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT CASES, 7(1), 2010: 7-31 4. It charged for baggage discriminately. For example, it imposed additional charges on certain sports equipment checked-in separately by golfers, scuba divers and surfers. 5. Customers paid for other services or goods that were regarded as frills such as express boarding, in-fl ight meals and beverages, which were customarily provided by scheduled airlines as complimentary services. 6. AirAsia made it easier for customers to purchase air tickets, for example, by using the Internet or calling a telephone number and then going to an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) to pay. The proportion of revenue received via the Internet increased from 43 per cent in 2004 to 65 per cent in 2007 (see Table 1 ). 7. It identifi ed and fl ew to new destinations, for instance, Kuala Lumpur to Manado (in North Sulawesi, Indonesia)-a destination which would have required passengers to fl y via Jakarta or another major Indonesian airport. Some of these destinations and fl ight sectors were unique because no other airline fl ew to/or on them. 8. It publicized its new aircrafts. It banked on the idea that people are, by and large, curious and like new things or technologies. On its short haul or regional services, it used Airbus 320, which incidentally also led to savings in fuel and maintenance costs. At the time of writing this article, the airline was still in the process of restructuring its fl eet by selling and replacing the remaining nineteen Boeing 737s with Airbus 320s.
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By pricing its airfare into fi fteen tiers, AirAsia was able to maximize income from passenger seat sales and at the same time maximize the load factor. Additionally, it enabled the airline to offer prices that suited both price-sensitive and time-sensitive customers. Business travellers and last minute tourists, who could be regarded as cashrich but time-poor, for instance, would not mind paying a little more for late bookings while budget travellers, who could be regarded as time-rich but cash-poor, would look for bargain prices and would not mind purchasing tickets many months ahead of their travel dates. AirAsia benefi ted from differences in customers' perceptions of 'customer value' . A passenger travelling on an identical route on two different occasions might use two different criterions of good 'customer value'-an 'A' value when he pays a price at the lower tier several months in advance of travel dates to take his family for a holiday and another 'A' value when he attends an urgent business matter despite paying a price at the high tier to secure a seat at the last minute.
The lowest tier was zero airfare, and AirAsia publicized this as free seats-a strategy it used to increase its load factor. Perhaps it was a wise move to give away free seats rather than to fl y its aircrafts on a low load factor. Giving free seats was like giving away free samples of products that otherwise would have become obsolete (empty seats) as soon as the aircraft departed. Besides that, free seats gave non-air travellers the opportunity to travel by air for the fi rst time. Free seats also gave fi rst-time visitors the opportunity to see new destinations, and frequent visitors the opportunity to experience travelling on new routes. In any case, free fare passengers still had to pay for compulsory charges such as government taxes, and they most likely would purchase complementary products too. Taxes collected by AirAsia generated a signifi cant amount of cash fl oat (cash collected from passengers on behalf of government authorities which was remitted to the authorities at later dates) that would potentially generate interest income to AirAsia or free it from paying interest charges, if it were to take bank overdrafts to fi nance its working capital.
Additional charges such as excess baggage fee, special charges for golf bags and checked baggage handling fee were voluntary charges that passengers could avoid if they chose to travel without any checked-in baggage. In any case, one might argue, there was no reason why other baggage-free passengers should subsidize the charges imposed on baggage-ladened passengers. Passengers should also not be forced to pay for something that they did not particularly care about such as window seats, meals and beverages; but those who wanted them could purchase them. Customers, by and large, did not mind paying for something that they wanted to have or bear a certain level of inconvenience in return for a cheaper price. However, consumers could choose to defer their consumption or choose a substitute product when they felt that such consumption or product required too much sacrifi ce or caused them undue inconvenience.
AirAsia unlocked further demand for its products by introducing new destinations and fl ight sectors 16 because new routes reduced the level of inconvenience for some customers. For example, a journey from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta and then to Manado in North Sulawesi, Indonesia, would have taken travellers twice as much time as it took to fl y directly from Kuala Lumpur to Manado. Similarly, the higher frequency of fl ights on a particular sector offered more choices of time and reduced the risks of getting stranded for too long due to delayed or cancelled fl ights; overall, a high frequency of fl ights helped to reduce the total travel time. Arguably, one of the main reasons why Coca Cola and Pepsi became successful brands was their wide product availability-people could buy them almost anywhere in the world. AirAsia saw air travel simply as a mode of transport for people to move from one place to another in the most cost-effective manner. The airline competed not only with other airlines but also with trains, coaches or buses, ferries and private cars. The airline management realized that for the Malaysian people, the alternatives to travelling somewhere new or exotic were either spending their time at local shopping malls or restaurants or balik kampong, which means visiting their hometowns, 17 during public holidays.
18 By making their product user-friendly and easily accessible to customers, AirAsia unlocked further demand-demand from those who were initially apprehensive about travelling by air and/or feared the sophistication of travelling through airports, or those who felt too comfortable with their habit of staying at home during the holidays or shrugged off the idea of going to unfamiliar places. AirAsia made some Malaysian people get out of their cocoons and out of their comfort zones. The airline's red and white logo was visible everywhere in Malaysia and the colour theme (also in red and white) of two complementary companies, Tune Hotels and Tune Money, also helped to increase the level of AirAsia's brand awareness.
AirAsia encouraged its customers to use the Internet to obtain information on all its products and to purchase them directly from AirAsia. However, it acknowledged that not everyone had easy access to the Internet or was able to use it. The airline, therefore, helped customers to overcome that challenge by selling air tickets through its telephone call centres, travel agents and also over-the-counter at airport terminals. Although 17 Malaysian people, by and large, value close personal relationships among members of their extended families and many of them who work and live in the cities tend to take the opportunity to visit their parents during public holidays, in their home towns which in local language is synonymous to the word kampung but which literally means 'village', in English.
18 Malaysia has fourteen days of offi cial public holidays in a year. Not surprisingly, working Malaysian people prefer to take extended holidays, i.e., taking personal annual leave that coincides with public holidays and weekend holidays.
at LA SALLE UNIV on August 9, 2012 ajc.sagepub.com Downloaded from AirAsia preferred that its customers pay for the tickets online using credit cards, it also facilitated those who wanted to pay through travel agents, post offi ces, banks, at AirAsia's airport sales counters or through bank ATMs. AirAsia popularized new destinations by promoting them online, issuing regular press releases and advertising their new offers in national newspapers. Among others, these advertisements showed images of attractive places and proposed a 'to do list' of activities for visitors that ranged from eating to getting a medical checkup.
Fuel costs accounted for the largest chunk of AirAsia's operating expenses and quite clearly an astute management of fuel purchases was of paramount importance. However, on top of that, an airline also had to contain its high fi xed costs in terms of depreciation and mandatory maintenance of its most expensive assets-its aircrafts. AirAsia's strategy of using more Airbus 320s had paid off in the form of lower overall maintenance and operating costs. 19 In the long run, AirAsia should be able to further lower its unit cost of maintaining and operating an aircraft due to the economy of scale from owning a large fl eet of Airbus 320s. However, in the future, the airline may have to revise its policy of acquiring only Airbus 320s because they may need to open up more new routes that are unsuitable for Airbus 320s such as long-haul sectors (more than four hours of fl ying time) or destinations with airports that are too short for Airbus 320 to land and take off.
Product and Market Development
We examine AirAsia's product and market development strategies using the Blue Ocean Strategy concept. In proposing this concept, Kim and Mauborgne 20 argue that the distinction between successful and less successful companies is their strategic move. Dramatic growth in profi t, they argue, is dependent on the strategic move and not on any inherent capability within the organization. Kim and Mauborgne use the metaphor of red and blue oceans to describe the market universe. A red ocean refers to the current market space that is very competitive. Less successful companies (organizations), they argue, are always caught in the red ocean. A blue ocean, in contrast, refers to the unknown or unexplored market space, which has the potential for rapid growth, and those companies/organizations that are successful evidently create their own blue oceans. The cornerstone of the Blue Ocean Strategy is 'value innovation', which places equal emphasis on 'value' and 'innovation', and this occurs when a company aligns innovation with utility, price and cost position.
Like Southwest Airlines in the United States, AirAsia in Malaysia changed the way the airline industry should be seen. Through the Blue Ocean methodology, Figure 2 shows the landscape of the people transportation industry in Malaysia-two in air transport and one in land transport.
AirAsia reconfi gured the people transportation industry in Malaysia by redrawing the competing factors and taking a path that looked across the chain of buyers and users (Path 3). 21 Theoretically, in adopting this path, a company needed to explore who was paying for the product, who was using the product and who was infl uencing the use of the product. AirAsia, as Southwest Airlines had been doing for many years, and as Kim and Mauborgne (2005: 61) stated, practically challenged an industry's conventional wisdom about which target buyer group could lead to the discovery of the new blue ocean. AirAsia realized that Malaysian people visited neighbouring countries, particularly Thailand in the north and Indonesia in the south, for leisure and travelled frequently within the country to visit extended family members. For convenience, they tended to travel by cars, buses and trains within West Malaysia, to Singapore and to southern Thailand, and by air between East and West Malaysia.
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Overseas travel to Indonesia and the northern parts of Thailand was predominantly aboard scheduled airlines. In the past, air travellers had to purchase air tickets through travel agents and airline ticket offi ces. A majority of the Malaysians preferred to visit these three countries because they had close social connections with the Singaporean, Thai and Indonesian people, and also because the Malaysian currency, historically, had greater purchasing power in Thailand and Indonesia than in Malaysia. In addition, the Malaysian people were more familiar with and adaptable to local cultures in these countries. By understanding the needs of the vast majority of potential travellers at the lower end of the market, in terms of affordability, and by giving them the Note: The various levels of competing factors refl ect the judgement of the author based on his observation and knowledge of AirAsia and the airline and express industry in order to illustrate the application of the Blue Ocean Strategy concept. For example, on competing factor 1 (Price) Malaysia Airlines charges about four times the amount that AirAsia and bus companies charge, on an average. In implementing the Blue Ocean Strategy concept, companies have to do a study to establish those levels more accurately.
option of travelling by air, AirAsia enlarged its market substantially to also include passengers from Thailand and Indonesia, who were curious to visit their wealthier neighbour Malaysia. 23 These travellers also comprised more than a million foreign workers in Malaysia who had previously travelled by boats, ferries and buses to and from their countries.
AirAsia raised or reduced the levels of some competing factors and eliminated or created new competing factors. By lowering the price of air tickets, making it easier for people to book fl ights and purchase air tickets and making air travel less sophisticated to the low-end markets, AirAsia appeared to have unlocked the largest share/block of the previous non-customer type, i.e., individuals who had never fl own before and/or had not visited many exciting destinations. AirAsia's tag line, 'Now everyone can fl y' was a powerful proposition to such non-customers. Arguably, the airline had also de-segmented the market of business and economy travellers to simply budget travellers, which included those travelling on business and on leisure. In making it easier for corporations to use its services, AirAsia also provided a slightly more fl exible arrangement, whereby corporations were allowed to substitute passenger names on the bookings. The commonalities between leisure travellers and business travellers can be summarized by their preferences for low prices, high frequency of fl ights, more destinations and fl ight sectors. One of AirAsia's strengths, which was not obvious to customers, was its partnerships with other organizations that helped the airline to reduce costs and improve services, which in turn created competing factors that were important for the customers, such as lower prices, ease of purchasing and ease of using AirAsia's products. AirAsia's achievements are as follows:
1. Its actions seemed to fi t in with Path 3, which was looking across the chain of buyers and users. 2. It reconstructed the industry boundaries and opened up avenues to noncustomers to not only have easy access to its products but also to easily and conveniently use them. 3. It identifi ed the commonalities across non-customer types-budget-conscious leisure travellers and budget-conscious business travellers who looked for 'value' .
4. In its four action framework, which is also refl ected in Figure 2 , AirAsia took the following steps:
a. Elimination of fi rst and business class air travel and their frills or complementary services such as dedicated business class lounges, hub connectivity, special check-in counters, chauffer-driven airport transfers and exquisite and branded meals and beverages aboard its aircrafts. The airline also eliminated customized services associated with classes of service such as special checkin counters, boarding gates, china plates and cups, a selection of in-fl ight catered meals and beverages and gifts. b. Reduction in ticket prices. Prices were reduced by a reduction in or elimination of a number of complementary products that scheduled airlines customarily provided, such as travel date fl exibility and in-fl ight catered meals. It reduced the sophistication of air travel such as the ritual of booking and paying through travel agents, checking in early, waiting in lounges, grouping passengers into classes, allowing extra large and more than one piece of luggage, issuing printed tickets and ticket dockets and issuing a variety of boarding passes. All in all, the airline reduced the formality of air travel to a simple process of ordering, paying and showing up at the airport with only limited baggage, and dressing in the same simple attire as one would wear at bus terminals or train stations. Instead of having to queue at the usual check-in counters, AirAsia customers were able to use self check-in kiosks at selected airports or do web check-in on all its fl ights and then simply leave their luggage at the special counters. The elimination of the usual complementary products and simplifi cation of product use helped to speed up service delivery and aircraft turnaround time to around twenty-fi ve minutes. c. Reduction of above-the-line marketing activities and luxuries in the cabin made the company appear down-to-earth. Cabin seat covers were normally in dark leather for ease of cleaning and durability. AirAsia portrayed itself as a mode of transport and not a fl ying fi ve-star hotel. d. By increasing the number of destinations, sectors or routes, and the fl ight frequency on its routes, budget conscious Malaysian people could, as of 31 March 2009, visit sixty-four destinations in fi fteen countries. At the same time, by opening new routes, AirAsia opened up the possibility of passengers from Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, China, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, India, Great Britain and Australia to visit Malaysia by fl ying directly to a number of Malaysian cities. AirAsia's cooperation with its subsidiaries and associate companies in opening new destinations and routes also enhanced its global connectivity. e. The airline raised its level of friendliness through staff training, staff performance incentives and an improved work environment. f. The airline raised the frequency of point-to-point departures and, together with a quick aircraft turnaround time, also raised the overall speed of a journey, i.e., minimum waiting and different choices between fl ights. g. By encouraging the use of the Internet, the airline created simpler methods for customers to fi nd information on air travel and purchase of items and services. Partnerships with other organizations increased their customers' accessibility to their products and reduced the cost of obtaining them. All of these efforts raised the level of ease in planning for travel, buying travel seats, choices of routes and in using AirAsia's services.
5. AirAsia created a high-value product offering. The AirAsia product was differentiated in terms of low-price, no-frills, high frequency, point-to-point fl ights, more routes and destinations and ease in creating a variety of the actual products that the customers desired. It was low price relative to other modes of transport and their corresponding level of convenience. For example, a one-way fi rstclass train ticket from Kuala Lumpur Sentral to Singapore (airfare is based on seven-day advance booking rates for travel on 17 March 2009 by the author) would cost MYR 68 (US$ 19.4) and would take about seven and a half hours. The total travel time when using AirAsia, including travel time from Kuala Lumpur Sentral to Kuala Lumpur Low-Cost Carrier Terminal, would be less than half the time taken to travel by train and would cost almost the same, including taxes (MYR 56.50 or US$ 16.2 as the lowest available airfare on the day of travel plus another MYR 10 or US$ 2.9 for a bus ride from Sentral station to the airport). A self-drive journey would have cost more than MYR 150 (US$ 42.9) in fuel and road toll charges. 24 The same seven-day advance ticket on a scheduled airline would cost more than MYR 300 (US$ 85.7). 6. AirAsia unbundled various components of air travel. It kept the core product, i.e., a passenger seat on a particular route low, and charged for all other complementary products that the customers desired. Its available seat per kilometre (ASK) was at the lowest level in the world, i.e., at 3.29 US cents (see Table 1 ). AirAsia had fi fteen tiers of its core product price, the lowest being zero. The 'right' strategic price/s had unlocked more demand for air travel from a wider market-budget travellers who agreed to pay at various price levels which suited their travel situation and use context, for example, business versus holiday trips and hurry versus leisure. 7. AirAsia made new strategic moves by (a) looking across complementary products and service offerings (Path 4), (b) looking across the functional and emotional appeal for buyers (Path 5) and (c) looking across alternative industries, which yielded new insights regarding services and delivery, respectively (Path 1). Under Path 4, AirAsia made it easier and cheaper for people to go to the airport, use airport terminals, fi nd budget hotels, eat and have fun, thereby making the total cost of visiting a new place affordable to its customers. AirAsia together with its subsidiaries and associate companies offered new regional destinations as well as low-cost long-haul air travel to Europe and Australia. In the past, AirAsia competed largely on the functionality of products but by taking Path 5, the airline added elements to make its solutions a bit more emotional, for example, through its association with the Manchester United Football Club, it enabled people to buy e-gifts, which could be used by benefi ciaries to buy air tickets. In taking Path 1, AirAsia launched AirAsia Corporate, and government warrants 25 in 2008 saw blue chip companies and government departments trade across (switch) from scheduled airlines to AirAsia. 8. In refl ecting on the fi nal stage of the Blue Ocean Strategy (developing high value, low-cost service and delivery offerings), AirAsia implemented a number of strategies that, in terms of the Blue Ocean Strategy, created further uncontested market space. It enhanced its services and product delivery and these included the following:
a. At a small charge, AirAsia gave customers the choice of enjoying added benefi ts such as boarding the aircraft fi rst, ahead of other passengers, ordering their favourite and often local meals in advance and changing fl ights and passenger names. It also sold travel insurance that would compensate customers for fl ight delays, lost baggage and accidents, etc.
b. It continued to encourage the use of the Internet to purchase tickets but also facilitated those who did not have the Internet or those who did not want to use it to buy tickets easily. The airline, for instance, persuaded certain partners such as travel agents, banks and post offi ces to handle some or all parts of the purchase transaction. Customers, for instance, could use bank ATMs or go to the post offi ce counters to make payments. Other alternatives included allowing someone to purchase e-vouchers that could be given to someone else to purchase air tickets, which effectively was allowing anyone who had a credit card to buy a cash voucher and give it to anyone, for example, a traveller who did not have a credit card could use it to purchase a passenger ticket. Similarly, its related company, Tune Money issued pre-paid debit cards that could be used to pay for air tickets; therefore, those who did not qualify for a credit card could use this pre-paid card facility. c. AirAsia clearly recognized the potential emotional appeal of its product. It did that by associating itself with the English Premier League Cup Competition and the Manchester United Football Club, which had a large number of football fans in Malaysia.
AirAsia Tomorrow
What is in store for AirAsia? The year 2008 was a year of crisis for most industries and in particular, the airline industry. It was predicted that this crisis would continue through to 2009 and 2010. For the most part of 2007 and 2008, the price of crude oil stayed at above US$ 80 per barrel, and according to AirAsia 26 there was a lot of volatility in the price of jet fuel, interest rates, foreign exchange rates and liquidity. These challenges required an airline to be skillful not only in managing its core business operations, which were air services, but also its fi nance and supply chain management.
In terms of Blue Ocean 'thinking', AirAsia still had an enormous market waiting to be tapped both in Malaysia and outside Malaysia. Malaysia was made up of many ethnic groups. Malay, Chinese and Indians, being the three largest groups, would fi nd destinations in Indonesia, China and India, respectively, appealing. Paths 3 and 4 were potentially attractive routes to building new Blue Oceans. New opportunities to create new demand should come not just from introducing new destinations but also from new routes within existing destinations, for example, Penang (in Malaysia) to Bandung (in Indonesia), instead of only Kuala Lumpur (in Malaysia) to Bandung so that Malaysian people in Penang can go to Bandung directly instead of going via Kuala Lumpur. When AirAsia announced and eventually started fl ying from Singapore to four Indonesian cities on 24 March 2009, the airline attracted 80,000 forward bookings (reported on 31 March 2009 through AirAsia's press release) and as of that date, AirAsia was the only airline that fl ew the Singapore-Bandung sector and the only low-cost airline that served the Singapore-Yogyakarta sector. Figure 2 illustrates the strategy canvass 27 of AirAsia versus average scheduled airlines and average express coaches in Malaysia. The exact levels of each competing factor possessed by each solution provider were debatable but, overall, Figure 2 refl ects the reality of the shift in the shape of AirAsia's canvass in which its trend line crossed the path of average scheduled airlines and indicated that it raised the level of certain factors (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17) , most of which were its after-sales services. It is not inconceivable that scheduled airlines will, in the future, follow the trend set by AirAsia, at which time AirAsia would have to identify new competing factors. Coach operators, for instance, could easily copy some of AirAsia's strategy, particularly in raising the level of competing factors 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17. It would be notoriously challenging for a scheduled airline to compete with AirAsia on a similar set of competing factors because of its higher cost in keeping competing factors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 at a high level.
Economically, Malaysia is a developing country. Being an export-oriented country, it unfortunately also had to bear the brunt of the global banking or credit crunch crisis that began in the US in 2007. In 2008, Malaysia's quarterly gross domestic production growth rate plummeted from 7.4 per cent in the fi rst quarter to 0.1 per cent in the fourth quarter. However, despite the economic slowdown, per capita gross national income for the third quarter was estimated to grow to MYR 27,674 at current prices (an equivalent to about US$ 8,000) or 20 per cent better than in 2007. 28 
